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INDIANA L.4IV JOURN.4L
that the clause is not applicable to contracts that may or may not be performed
within one year.O Again, referring to the court's dictum regarding leases and
admitting that the lease would be one for more than three years, it would
seem by analogy that if the lease might be performed within the statutory
period, it would be outside the statute. The drawing of such an analogy would
be important in the principal case, for here the lease (if it were one) might
have been performed within the statutory period were either party to give
notice to terminate. It is true that in drawing such an analogy a result would
be reached which would be consistent with what is sometimes said to be the
trend of modern cases to nullify the operation of the statute of frauds.10 The
New York case of Ward v. Hasbrouck holds that a lease for more than the
statutory period is outside the statute if there is a possibility that the lease
might be terminated within the statutory period."1 That case, however, has
been criticized on the ground that the principles applicable to contracts not to
be performed within one year should not apply to leases, since the latter are
in the nature of conveyances rather than executory contracts. 12 The courts
of Indiana do not apply the analogy and consistently hold that these leases which
are of a term greater than that provided by the statute, but which might be
terminated before the statutory period has elapsed are within the statute of
frauds.13 O.E.B.
BAILMENTS-LIABILITY OF BAILOR FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO BAILEE RESULTING
FROM VICIOUS PROPENSITIES OF THE BAILED ANIMAL.-In April, 1931, the
defendant company rented a team of mules and a mare to plaintiff's decedent
and his nephew. The animals were used in defendant's business and were
stabled and cared for in decedent's barn. Decedent's nephew worked the
mare and paid defendant for her use while decedent worked the mules. On
August 11, 1931, the defendant suggested that the mare be worked with one of
the mules and the parties agreed upon the exchange. Thereafter, but before
the mare had been used in the team, she kicked the decedent causing injuries
which resulted in his death. It is agreed that the relation between the
decedent and defendant is that of bailee and bailor. The complaint "is
predicated upon the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant in knowingly
9 Wiggins v. Keizer (1855), 6 Ind. 452; Wilson v. Ray (1859), 13 Ind. 1,
Hill v. Jamieson (1861), 16 Ind. 125, 79 Am. Dec. 414, Indiana & I C. R. Co.
v. Scearce (1864), 23 Ind. 223, Bell v. Hewitt (1865), 24 Ind. 280; Frost
v. Tarr (1876), 53 Ind. 290; Parker v. Siple (1881), 76 Ind. 345, Hinkle v.
Fisher (1885), 104 Ind. 84, 3 N. E. 524, Piper v. Fosher (1889), 121 Ind.
407, 23 N. E. 269; Durham v. Hiatt (1890), 127 Ind. 514, 26 N. E. 401, Decatur
v. McKean (1906), 167 Ind. 249, 78 N. E. 982; Freas v. Custer (1928), 201
Ind. 159, 166 N. E. 434, Pennsylvania Co. v. Dolan (1892), 6 Ind. App. 109,
32 N. E. 802, 51 Am. St. 289; American Quarries Co. v. Lay (1905), 37 Ind.
App. 386, 75 N. E. 608, Timmonds v. Taylor (1911), 48 Ind. App. 531, 96
N. E. 331.
10Willis, Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism (1928), 3 Ind. Law
Journal 427, at page 539.
11 Ward v. Hasbrouck (1902), 169 N. Y. 407, 62 N. E. 434.
12 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, vol. 2, page 1518.
13 Schmitz v. Laoferty (1868), 29 Ind. 400. Had the lease in the principal
case been for three years to start some time in the future, the lease would
have been within the statute regardless of the question raised by the fact
that it could have been performed in three years.
RECENT CASE NOTES
hiring a vicious and ugly mare to decedent without warning him of such
characteristics." Verdict for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Held, that since
decedent had notice of the vicious characteristics of the mare from conversion
with his nephew, the defendant, assuming it possessed this knowledge, was
relieved from imparting the same to the decedent; that conversation with
defendant's officer amounted only to a suggestion, not an order, by defendant
that the change be made, and, therefore, decedent was at liberty to make change
or not as he saw fit; that since the injury occurred before decedent actually
worked the mare, there was no causal connection between the exchange and
the injury.1
There are two classes of cases having a direct bearing on the problem in-
volved in this case, namely: (1) the master and servant cases, where the
servant is injured by an animal furnished by the master, and (2) the bailment
for hire cases, chiefly those concerning injuries caused by horses rented from a
livery stable. The cases cited in the opinion include both classes.
In considering the first class, the master's duty to warn is based upon his
duty to furnish reasonably safe working conditions or to warn the servant of
risks which he may not discover by the exercise of due care. 2 The law seems
well settled that a master owes his servant the duty to furnish him with a
safe animal, or to impart to the servant any knowledge which he has or by the
exercise of proper diligence ought to have which would enable the servant
to protect himself better; and if he fails to do so, he must respond in damages,
provided the servant did not know or was under no obligation to know of the
animal's viciousness. 3 However, the master is not liable if he has no actual
or constructive knowledge of the animal's vicious character and is under no
obligation to know them.4 Neither is he liable if the servant knows or has
reason to know of the animal's dangerous characteristics. 5 This is variously
referred to as contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The latter
I Artificial Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Martin (1935), - Ind. App. -, 198
N. E. 446.2 Hammond Co. v. Johnson (1893), 38 Nebr. 244, 56 N. W 967, Restate-
ment of Agency, Sec. 471 and 492; Mechem, Outlines of Agency (3rd Ed.
1923), Sec. 427., Leigh v. Omaha St. R. Co. (1893), 36 Nebr. 131, 54 N. W 134.
3 Hammond Co. v. Johnson (1893), 38 Nebr. 244, 56 N. W 967, Wilson
v. Sioux Mining Co. (1898), 16 Utah 392, 52 Pac. 626, Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Finn (1897), 50 Fed. 483, 51 U. S. 256, 25 C. C. A. 579; Miller v.
Kelly Coal Co. (1909), 239 11. 626, 88 N. E. 196, East Jellico Coal Co. v.
Stewart (1902), 24 Ky. Law Rep. 420, 68 S. W 624, Farmer v. Cumberland
Tel. & Tel. Co. (1905), 86 Miss. 55, 38 So. 775, Leigh v. Omaha St. R. Co.
(1893), 36 Nebr. 131, 54 N. W 134, McCready v. Stapp (1903), 104 Mo. App.
340, 78 S. W 671, Helwke v. Stetler (1893), 69 Hun 107, 23 N. Y. S. 392;
Gray v. Floersheim (1894), 164 Pa. St. 508, 30 At. 397, Morgan v. Hendrick
(1907), 80 Vt. 284, 67 Ad. 702. See also note in 19 Ann. Cases 863 and note
in 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 209.
4 Hosmer v. Carney (1920), 228 N. Y. 73, 126 N. E. 650; Arkansas Smokeless
Coal Co. v. Pippins (1909), 92 Ark. 138, 122 S. W 113; Benoit v. Troy & L. R.
Co. (1897), 154 N. Y. 223, 48 N. E. 524; Cooper v. Cashman (1906), 190
Mass. 75, 76 N. E. 461.
r Douglas v. Scandial Coal Co. (1913), 161 Iowa 180, 141 N. W 960;
Bowles v. Ind. Ry. Co. (1901), 27 *Ind. App. 672, 62 N. E. 94; Bessemer Land
& Improvement Co. v. Dubose (1900), 125 Ala. 442, 28 So. 380; Green & C.
Street Pass. R. Co. v. Bresmer (1881), 97 Pa. St. 103; Manufacturer's Fuel
Co. v. White (1905), 122 I1. App. 527.
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logically appears to be the better term. 6 Whether the master knew of the
animal's vicious propensities or not is a question for the jury to determine.7
The same is true concerning the question of whether the animal was in fact
dangerous either to persons or property.8 Likewise, it is for the jury to
determine whether or not the servant knew or should have known of the
vicious tendencies of the animal.9
In the second group of cases-those where a horse is hired from the keeper
of a livery stable-it is generally held that the bailor must furnish a horse
which is reasonably safe for the purpose contemplated.10 This applies equally
to carriages, harness, and other equipment furnished by the liveryman."1 If
the horse or equipment were not safe and the bailor either knew, or by the
exercise of reasonable care, ought to have known they were not safe, then he
is liable to the bailee for resulting injuries, unless the bailor, at the time of
the hiring, warned the lailee by imparting to him such information as the
bailor possessed.' 2  This, of course, does not mean that he is liable for
hidden defects of which he did not know or could not have ascertained by a
careful inspection.13
While there are some English cases holding that a hirer of horses and
carriages warrants that they are reasonably safe and suitable for the purpose, 1 4
the American cases generally treat the liability as the negligent failure to
perform a duty imposed by law.1 5 It seems the law requires a high degree of
care in the performance of this duty, however.1 0
6 See A. L. I. analysis of contributory negligence, Restatement of Torts,
Sec. 466.
7 Benoit v. Troy L. R. Co. (1897), 154 N. Y. 223, 48 N. E. 524, Hammond
Co. v. Johnson (1893), 38 Nebr. 244, 56 N. W 967, Farmer v. Cumberland
Tel. & Tel. Co. (1905), 86 Miss. 55, 38 So. 775.
8 East Jellico Coal Co. v. Stewart (1902), 24 Ky. Law Rep. 420, 68 S. W
624, Farmer v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. (1905), 86 Miss. 55, 38 So. 775.
9 Manufacturer's Fuel Co. v. White (1905), 122 Ill. App. 527, Wilson
v. Sioux Consol. Min. Co. (1898), 16 Utah 392, 52 Pac. 626, Farmer v. Cum-
berland Tel. & Tel. Co. (1905), 86 Miss. 55, 38 So. 775.
10 Home v. Meakin (1874), 115 Mass. 326, Windle v. Jordan (1883), 75
Maine 149; Lynch v. Richardson (1895), 163 Mass. 160, 39 N. E. 801, Nisbet
v. Wells (1903), 25 Ky. 511, 76 S. W 120; see also note in 25 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 372.
IlKissam v. Jones (1890), 56 Hun. 432, 10 N. Y. S. 94, Hadley v. Cross
(1861), 34 Vt. 586, 80 Am. Dec. 699; Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. v. Madigan
(1912), 21 Colo. App. 131, 120 Pac. 1044.
12 Nisbet v. Wells (1912), 25 Ky. 511, 76 S. W 120; Kissam v Jones
(1890), 56 Hun. 432, 10 N. Y. S. 94, Windle v. Jordan (1883), 75 Maine
149; Hadley v. Cross (1861), 34 Vt. 586, 80 Am. Dec. 699; Home v. Meakin
(1874), 115 Mass. 326, see also note in 18 Ann. Cas. 814.
13 Hadley v. Cross (1861), 34 Vt. 586, 80 Am. Dec. 699; Denver Omnibus
& Cab Co. v. Madigan (1912), 21 Colo. App. 131, 120 Pac. 1044.
14 Jones v. Page (1867), 15 L. T. N. S. 619; Hyman v. Nye (1881),
6 Q. B. Div. 685, 44 L. T. N. S. 919; Chew v. Jones (1847), 10 L. T. Journ.
231, see also note 19 L. R. A. 283.
15 Dickie & Goelzer v. Henderson- (1912), 95 Ark. 78, 128 S. W 561,
Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. v. Madigan (1912), 21 Colo. App. 131, 120
Pac. 1044.
16 See Hadley v. Cross (1861), 34 Vt. 586, 80 Am. Dec. 699, where the
court said, "Due care and reasonable diligence are nothing less than the
most watchful care and active diligence in any business involving the per-
sonal safety and care of others."
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In determining the bailor's liability, it is generally held that livery stable
keepers, whose business is to care for the horses and carriages of others and
to let their own horses and carriages either with or without drivers, are not
common carriers of passengers within the legal meaning of that term.1 7
It is a question for the jury whether the bailor knew of the horse's
viciousness, 1 8 or whether he was negligent either in failing to discover the
vice or lack of training of the animal or in hiring to the bailee a horse which
was not suitable for the use contemplated.10  Whether the bailor gave the
bailee sufficient warning to relieve himself from liability is also a question for
the jury.2O
While there seems to be no previous Indiana cases which are conclusive
upon the point in issue, the court in the instant case follows the generally
accepted principles of law on the subject. H. S. C.
17 Stanley v. Steele (1905), 77 Conn. 68S, 60 Atl. 640, 69 A. L. R. 561;
Payne v. Halstead (1891), 44 Ill. App. 97, Seigrist v. Arnot (1885), 86 Mo.
200, 56 Am. Rep. 424, Erickson v. Barber Bros. (1891), 83 Iowa 367, 49
N. W 838; Copeland v. Draper (1893), 157 Mass. 558, 32 N. E. 944;
McGregor v. Gill (1905), 114 Tenn. 521, 86 S. W 318, 108 Am. St. Rep. 919.
'8 Lynch v. Richardson (1895), 163 Mass. 160, 39 N. E. 108.
10 Dickie & Goelzer v. Henderson (1910), 95 Ark. 78, 128 S. W 561;
Denver Omnibus & Cab Co. v. Madigan (1912), 21 Colo. App. 131, 120 Pac.
1014.
20 Windle v. Jordan (1884), 75 Me. 149.
